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The Judicial Power in Canada: The Mirror of a Pluralistic 
Society 
di Eleonora Ceccherini 
Abstract: Il potere giudiziario in Canada come specchio di una società pluralistica – The 
article deals with the issue of the reflective judiciary in Canada. It especially looks at the 
composition of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court Act provides that three judges must 
be appointed among judges or lawyers coming from Quebec and the essay tries to survey if 
the francophone judges reflect the interests of the community they belong to. In order to 
evaluate this perspective, the article checks if the three judges are used to jointly deliver 
dissenting opinions validating the hypothesis that they defend the Quebec identity. The 
results show a different attitude and thus we can conclude that the presence of francophone 
judges does not constitute a “francophone party”; it rather contributes to increase the 
confidence of Quebec people in the federal judiciary and moreover it assures expertise in civil 
law. 
Keywords: Supreme court, judicial review, federal state, civil law, linguistic rights. 
1. Biculturalism and Bijuralism: The Canadian “brand” 
The study of the Canadian legal system has always awakened legal scholars’ 
interests, both in the field of public and private law, for its significant peculiarities 
which appear at the institutional, political, social and economic level. Canada has 
a federal organisation and two legal systems coexist in its institutional framework: 
civil law, and common law; likewise, there are two official languages: French and 
English. Despite being an independent state with its own flag and its own 
constitutional system, the British monarch continues to be the Head of the State 
and the Queen is portrayed on Canadian dollars. From an economic perspective, 
there is a strong divergence between the Western Provinces, strongly exploiting 
natural resources, and the Eastern ones – specifically Ontario and Quebec – with 
a strong industrial vocation1. It is necessary to add some further remarks to the 
Canadian “duality”: first, Aboriginal communities, occupying the territory before 
the arrival of European colonists, were recognized the status of Founding Peoples; 
second, the population is conspicuously composed of people who migrated in 
Canada more recently.   
                                                                  
1 P. Foucher, La double dualité du Canada et ses consequences juridiques, in P. Thibault, B. Pelletier, 
L. Perret (eds.), Les melanges Gérald –A. Beaudoin. Les défis du constitutionalisme, Cowansville, 
2002, 163 ff.; G. Martinico, La genesi “mista” dell’asimmetria canadese, in G. Delledonne, G. 
Martinico, L. Pierdominici (eds.), Il costituzionalismo canadese a 150 anni dalla Confederazione. 
Riflessioni comparatistiche, Pisa, 2017, 15 ff. 
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 The choice of a federal asset is linked to the idea of keeping the Provinces 
autonomous, in order to limit the trend of decentralization resulting in the 
problematic coexistence of former French colonies and the Anglophone Dominion. 
The former French colonies are characterized by a civil law system, French as a 
common language and catholic religion, often invoked for nationalist  purposes2; 
whereas the Anglophone Dominion is characterized by a system of common law, 
English as a common language, and Protestant origins3. The attempt to anglicise 
those territories (i.e. The Provinces of Quebec and New Brunswick) immediately 
failed. Consequently, the British Crown accepted and recognised the civil law 
system through the Quebec Act of 1774. This Act provided that the former could 
regulate civil and property rights according to civil law, while they had to conform 
to, the common law system for criminal law and all other matters4. Keeping the 
former civil law system implies using the language related to that system. With 
the approval of 1774 Act, a process of biculturalism and bijuralism was triggered. 
Such dualism would strongly influence the Canadian legal asset. Accepting two 
Founding Peoples and being aware of the impossibility to reduce to a one-single-
reality the dualistic legal nature Canadian political establishment to allow 
Provinces to regulate relationships between individual, as well as to let Quebec to 
                                                                  
2 In the territories occupied by the French Crown, the civil law system is adopted: la Compagnie 
des cents associés – founded in Quebec – officially imported Paris custom in 1627, and from 1667 
onwards – when the Compagnie is dissolved – local right gets directly borrowed as French law 
main source. In 1710, the British conquered the French colony of Acadia and deported the 
French, starting a process of Anglicization of this area. In this situation, apart from the French 
enclave, common law got imposed in the rest of Canada. The two colonizing processes are very 
different: the French had settled with commercial interests, and for this reason they had 
climbed up Saint Lawrence river with fur smugglers and missionaries, looking for new routes 
of communication; the British, instead, wanted to occupy lands for agricultural purposes and 
this is the reason why they were in a continuous spread. The Seven Years War (1756-1763) – 
whose core events took place in Europe – sees France and United Kingdom at odds, fighting 
for their colonial possessions. The results of the conflict were not favorable for France, which, 
with the Treaty of Paris of 1763, was forced to surrender the territory that, nowadays, 
corresponds to New France. Firstly, the United Kingdom tried to start a process of 
Anglicization, through Royal Proclamation, in 1763. Although this act recognized the self-
government of colonies, it imposed the British law to all former French territories. However, 
this project was not carried out and French or Natives parties were allowed, through an act, 
to apply French law. In cases of legal controversies, a mixed composition of juries was 
required, depending on the linguistic affiliation of the involved parties. L. Bruti Liberati, L. 
Codignola, Storia del Canada. Dal primo contatto fra Europei e indiani alle nuove influenze nel 
pensiero politico mondiale, Milan-Florence, 2018, passim; F. Toriello, La circolazione del modello 
inglese in Canada e il rapporto con la tradizione di civil law. Un contributo alla ricostruzione, in G. 
Rolla (ed.), L’apporto della Corte suprema alla determinazione dei caratteri dell’ordinamento 
costituzionale canadese, Milan, 2008, 81 ff., M. Morin, Les débats concernant le droit français et le 
droit anglais antérieurment à l’adoption de l’Acte de Quebec de 1774, in 44 R.S.U.S., 259 (2014). 
3 The causes of this coexistence depend on historical reasons: a part of the Canadian territory 
which was colonized by the French, has been surrendered to the British Crown with the 
Treaty of Paris in 1763. 
4 The same Act allowed the use of French language, the right to practice Catholicism and the 
equal right to get access to public charges both for Anglophone and Francophone. A. 
Tremblay, Les compétences législatives au Canada et les pouvoirs provinciaux en matière de propriété 
et de droits civils, Ottawa, 1967, 27 ff. 
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adopt civil law. This was officialised by the British North America Act (BNA) of 
1867, which would give birth to the Dominion5.  
 However, this is not the end of frictions between Quebec and the Rest of 
Canada. Rather, they were even sharpened because the Provinces wanted to 
establish a federal system based on the equality among Provinces on one side, and 
on the other side, on the recognition of the status of distinct society to the French 
community. This dualism played a key role in shaping the history of Canada, as 
on the one hand the organization of public powers is justified by a foedus, which 
gathers all the territories for a question of efficiency of the system, and on the 
other hand such structure aims to maintain and guarantee the recognition of 
national identities6. Therefore, the Francophone nationalism is a recurring 
element in the political debate, and it cyclically remerges in different occasions 
throughout Canadian history, fostering a division from an ethnic and linguistic 
(and no longer religious) point of view.  
A crucial milestone, which turns the tension between the Francophone and 
Anglophone souls of Canada into a permanent feature of the system, is the so-
called “Quiet Revolution”7.  
 In this context, the figure of Pierre Elliot Trudeau emerged on the political 
horizon. Trudeau promoted the political project to integrate all the identities 
which made up the country, which at this point were no longer limited to the 
traditional Francophone and Anglophone components.  
 To pursue the goal of integration, the Premier adopted the 
Multiculturalism Policy of Canada (1971) aimed at recognizing the cultural 
pluralism of the country; nonetheless the approval of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms in 1982 put a full stop to the “duopoly” held by the Francophone and 
Anglophone components. The political goal of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms was to foster the unity of Canada and build a national identity. 
Trudeau’s vision entailing a pan-Canadian federal nationalism was opposed to the 
                                                                  
5 In 1841, the Act of Union came into effect: the two Provinces, the Lower Canada (Quebec) 
and the Upper Canada (Ontario) were merged to form a single Province; nonetheless, this Act 
did not achieve political stability and paved the way for the approval of British North America 
Act. Thereafter, in 1869, the Bay Hudson Company surrendered all the administrated 
territories (which would form, in the future, the Provinces of Manitoba, 1870, Alberta and 
Saskatchewan, 1905) to Dominion; in 1871, British Columbia joined Canada and in 1873, 
Prince Edward Island; in 1949, the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador joined the 
Federation. In 1975, Yukon and North-West Territories joined too; the third Territory, 
Nunavut, was founded in 1999. 
6 Ph. Resnick, Towards a Multinational Federalism: Asymmetrical and Confederal Alternatives, in 
F. Leslie Seidle (ed.), Seeking a New Canadian Partnership: Asymmetrical and Confederal Options, 
Montréal, 1994. About this topic, under a comparative point of view: E. Fossas, National 
Plurality and Equality, in F. Requejo (ed.), Democracy and National Pluralism, London-New 
York, 2001, 63; G. La Forest, What Canadian Federalism Means in Québec, in 15 Rev. const. st., 1 
(2010). 
7 This term refers to a series of events that took place in the period between the ‘60s and ‘70s, 
which is also characterised by some political, institutional and social reforms promoted by the 
Liberal Party of Quebec; J. Woehrling, La constitution canadienne et l’évolution des rapports entre 
le Québec et le Canada anglais de 1867 à nos jours, in Rev. fran. dr. const., 195 (1992); F. Rocher, 
The Quebec-Canada Dynamic or the Negation of the Ideal of Federalism, in A.-G. Gagnon (ed.), 
Contemporary Canadian Federalism, Toronto, 2006, 81 f. 
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Francophone’s one, which in turn had been exacerbated after the Quiet 
Revolution.  However, the Canadian Premier’s politics did not meet the favour of 
Quebec, which showed its distance from the political project by calling the direct 
democracy in 1980. On 20th May 1980, during the last stages of the approval of 
the Constitution Act, a popular consultation was called in order to legitimize the 
francophone Province government to negotiate its full sovereignty with the 
possibility to maintain economic and commercial relations with the Federation8. 
Quebec voters (representing 59.6% of the votes) were able to reject this hypothesis 
but there was no chance to concretely stop the Prime Minister’s project, since he 
wanted to proceed unilaterally to the enactment of the Constitution Act, without 
the consent of the Provinces. Three of these, Quebec, Manitoba and New 
Foundland, first referred the issue to their Courts of Appeal for an advisory 
opinion and then to the Supreme Court. The latter expressed the existence of a 
constitutional convention, implying the duty to negotiate and obtain a substantial 
degree of provincial consent without the obligation to reach a unanimous decision. 
After this opinion, Premier Trudeau started again the negotiation process for 
Patriation. The consensus on his project grew with the exception of Quebec, which 
asked once again an advisory opinion to the Supreme Court on whether a 
unanimity decision was needed for any law affecting the responsibilities of 
Provinces and the right to veto by the Francophone party. The reference was only 
delivered after the definitive approval of the Constitution Act and held that, 
according to constitutional conventions Quebec was not empowered to block the 
process amending the British North America Act 9.  
In 1982, the Patriation resulted in a significant political success for Premier 
Trudeau and represented one of the most relevant achievements for Canadian 
constitutional law. Unfortunately, the constitutional process was not able to 
incorporate the francophone community, whose attempts to be recognized as a 
distinct society were frustrated10. Then, two further proposals of constitutional 
reform were issued: the Meech Lake Accord of 1987 and the Charlottetown Accord 
of 1992. They were meant to introduce some clauses recognising the québécoise 
speciality, but they were not finalised11.  
These further failures ended up reinforcing the nationalist ambitions of 
Quebec and in 1995, once again, the Provincial Government called a referendum 
for the secession of the Province. Votes in favour of keeping part of the Federation 
                                                                  
8 As known, the results was not favorable to the secessionist claims but the francophone 
political élite called an another referendum in 1995 with the same purpose. 
9 Renvoi: opposition à une resolution pour modifier la Constitution (1982) 2 RCS, 793. J. 
Robillard, Constitutional Conventions: The Canadian Supreme Court’s Views Reviewed, in Public 
Law, 183 (1981); J.F. Gaudreault-Des Biens, The “Principle of Federalism” and the Legacy of the 
Patriation and Quebec Veto References, in 54 Supreme Court L. Rev., 77 (2011). 
10 F. Lanchester, La «Patriation» della Costituzione canadese: verso un nuovo federalismo?, in Riv. 
trim. dir. pubbl. 1983, 337 ff.; T. Groppi, Federalismo e Costituzione, Milan, 2001, 187; F. 
Astengo, Il Quebec: storia di una specialità negata, in G. Rolla (ed.), Regimi giuridici speciali di 
autonomia delle comunità territoriali, Milan, 2013, 143; J. Cameron, Legality, Legitimacy and 
Constitutional Amendment in Canada, in R. Albert, D. R. Cameron (eds.), Canada in the World. 
Comparative Perspectives on the Canadian Constitution, Cambridge, 2018, 98. 
11 M. Bastarache, L’Accord constitutionnel de 1987 et la protection des minorités francophones hors 
Québec, in 34 McGill L. J. 1, 119 (1988-1989).  
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slightly prevailed (49.42% yes, 50.58% no); hence the central government asked 
the Supreme Court for an advisory opinion concerning the legitimacy of a possible 
unilateral secession of Quebec. The court answered that firstly, the territorial and 
political separation would only be legitimate through an agreement between the 
Federation and Province (in other words, a unilaterally decision was not 
admissible), and, secondly, supreme principles of the Canadian system had to be 
respected. Such principles consisted of the rule of law, constitutionalism, 
federalism, democracy and protection of minorities12. 
The legislative follow-up to the advisory opinion was set forth in the Clarity 
Act, 2000: “An Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the 
opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference”. The 
Federal Act requires that Parliament preliminary states if the requires that the 
Parliament preliminary states if the question that people are asked to answer 
through the referendum is clear enough. After the referendum, the Parliament also 
has to assess whether the popular consultation resulted in a clear manifestation of 
will and whether there is an evident majority.  
In the same year, in response to the Federal Act, the National Assembly of 
Quebec passed another act named: “An Act respecting the exercise of the 
fundamental rights and prerogatives of the Québec people and the Québec State”. 
This law states that Quebec can exercise its right to choose its political regime, 
including sovereignty, and that in a referendum the option obtaining is whichever 
obtains 50% + 1 of the votes must prevail13. 
However, the francophone speciality has never received any formal 
recognition, apart from a small exception, i.e. a Parliamentary resolution of 22 
November 2006 on proposal of Harper government stating that: «(…) que cette 
Chambre reconnaisse que les Québécoises et les Québécois forment une nation au 
sein d’un Canada uni»14. 
The brief analysis presented above shows how Canada is a system seeking 
the balance between two cultures: particularly, the one considered as a minority 
aims at having a specific identity recognition at constitutional level within the 
Federation, and this could undermine reciprocal ties. Indeed, two additional 
                                                                  
12 G. Rolla, Il referendum sulla sovranità del Quebec ed il futuro del Canada. Alcuni paradossi 
costituzionali, in Giur. cost., 1996, 3269; E. P. Mendes, The Legacy of the Quebec Secession Reference 
Ruling in Canada and Internationally, in G. Delledonne, G. Martinico (eds.), The Canadian 
Contribution to a Comparative Law of Secession, Cham, 2018, 9 ff.; J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens, 
The Law and Politics of Secession: From the Political Contingency of Secession to a “Right to Decide”? 
Can Lessons Be Learned from the Quebec Case?, in G. Delledonne, G. Martinico (eds.), The 
Canadian Contribution, cit., 33 ff.; R. Louvin, The Relations between Canada and Quebec:An 
Appraisal in this issue.  
13 R. Louvin, Quo vadis, Québec? Les rebondissements constitutionnels récents d’une revendication 
historique, in O. Palusci, M. Casagranda, E. Ceccherini (eds.), Canada in the Making, Cambridge, 
2018 (forthcoming). 
14 Resolution of November 27th, 2017 2006 par 265 Debats de la Chambre des communes, 39° 
parl, 1 re sess, vol. 141, n° 84 on November 22nd, 2006 5197. About the relationship between 
the Premier Harper and Quebec, please see: G. Laforest, Trust and Mistrust Between Harper and 
Québec, in A. López-Basaguren, L. Escajedo San Epifanio (eds.), The Ways of Federalism in 
Western Countries and the Horizons of Territorial Autonomy in Spain, vol. II, Berlin-Heidelberg, 
2013, 341. 
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cleavages emerge: the former depends on the presence of First Nations, the latter 
is related to the numerous communities of immigrants.   
2. Provincial and Legal Cultures Representation in the Supreme Court 
Despite being a Federal State, Canada did not choose a two-tier jurisdiction.  The 
judiciary  is national but it is organized at a provincial level. The unitary choice is 
the result of a precise orientation carried out at the moment of the adoption of the 
BNA, because the Founding Fathers explicitly refused the United States two-tier 
model, considering it detrimental to correct and impartial application of justice. 
At the highest Canadian jurisdiction there is the Supreme Court, which, besides 
being a court of last instance, in 1982 also became a body carrying out judicial 
review of legislation15.  
The choice of the selection process of judges, whose appointment is up to the 
executive, is the consequence of the British motherland’s will considering it as an 
eligible mechanism to remove the judicial function from the influences of social 
communities in which the judicial bodies were located. During the debate on the 
BNA, no criticisms related to this option emerged, in the word of Sir Hector-Louis 
Langevin, who said in 1865: «by leaving these appointments to the Central 
Government, we are satisfied that the selection will be made from men of the 
highest order of qualifications, that the external and local pressure will not be so 
great, and the Government will be in a position to act more freely»16.  
A specific analysis must be carried out in relation to the Supreme Court, a 
judicial body that underwent considerable transformation during the years.   
In fact, looking at the legislative history of the British North America Act 
(BNA), it is possible to notice that the Founding Fathers were inclined to assign 
to a judicial body the task to solve the conflicts of competence between Federation 
and Provinces. On the one side, the U.S. model of the Supreme Court was very 
influential, on the other side Canadian Provinces, and especially Quebec, were 
reluctant to establish the Supreme Court given the representatives assemblies’ loss 
of influence in respect of the judicial branch17.  
 At the beginning, the BNA stated that conflict between Federation and 
Provinces would have been solved through the power of disallowance. However 
this choice made the central government the real hub of the system. For this 
reason Provinces pushed in order to pass an act introducing a court of appeal 
pursuant to sec. 101 BNA18. The Parliament was favourable to this solution, 
otherwise only the provincial judicial branch would have been the arbiter of the 
                                                                  
15 P.H. Russell, The Judiciary in Canada: The Third Branch of Government, Toronto, 1987. 
16 Sir Hector-Louis Langevin, in Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation 
of the British North American Provinces, 8th Prov. Parl. Of Canada, 3d Seff. (16 February 
1865) 387, quoted by C. Forcese, A. Freeman, The Laws of Government. The Legal Foundation 
of Canadian Democracy, Toronto, 2011, 249. 
17 J. Smith, The Origins of Judicial Review in Canada, in T. Morton (ed.), Law, Politics, and the 
Judicial Process, cit., 433 ff. 
18 Sec. 101 BNA: «The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding in this Act, from Time to 
Time provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of 
Appeal for Canada (…)». 
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allocation of competences between Federation and Provinces. In this way the 
introduction of the court was interpreted like a pro-federation choice.  
Therefore, the Supreme and Exchequer Act, 1875 was passed. It gave birth 
to the court of last resort in Canada19. The Bill was the result of a political bargain 
oriented to maintain the unity of the country and at the same time to recognize 
the differences between the two prevailing cultures. The body was made up of six 
judges, (five puisne judges and one chief justice) of whom two judges coming from 
Quebec. According to a custom two of them must come from Ontario and two 
from Maritimes Provinces. Thanks to the Act to Amend the Supreme Court Act, 
1949, the court became the judge of last instance for Canada and acquired the 
current configuration. Its members are nine judges, including the chief justice, 
three of whom are entitled to Quebec; whilst a customary source provides that 
three of them have to come from Ontario, the other two judges from Western 
Provinces and eventually one from Atlantic Provinces. The appointments are 
made by the Governor General on behalf of the Minister of Justice, while the Chief 
Justice is appointed by the Prime Minister and according to the same custom he 
or she must be alternatively Anglophone or Francophone.  
Differently from the appointment of members of other judicial bodies, the 
system of appointment to the Supreme Court still raises some criticism in relation 
to its effective capacity to help the government to select the most suitable 
candidates to this remarkable function. In fact, this method was criticized by legal 
scholars and politicians who claimed that also other state authorities should be 
vested with the power to appoint the Supreme Court judges20.  
The ongoing practice did not give birth to a common custom. Indeed, several 
solutions were followed. There have been not only unilateral appointments, but 
also designations that involved ad hoc parliamentary committees which included 
members of opposition parties who heard the candidate selected by the 
Government or who enlisted proper candidates presented to the Minister of 
Justice after consultation of judicial branch and of advocates of the interested 
Province21.   
                                                                  
19 I. Bushnell, Captive Court, Montréal, 1992, 4 ff. Until 1949, Privy Council will be the last 
judicial instance for the Canadian Dominion; P.W. Hogg, Canada: From Privy Council to 
Supreme Court, in J. Goldsworthy (ed.), Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study, New 
York, 2006, 55 ff. 
20 A. M. Dodeck, Reforming the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 2004-2014: A Ten Year 
Democratic Audit, in Supreme Court L. Rev., 112 (2014).  
21 M.A. Simonelli, Does judicial appointment process matter? Il caso della Corte suprema 
canadese, in federalismi.it, 5 (2016); R. Cairns Way, Deliberate Disregard: Judicial Appointments 
under the Harper Government, in 67 Supreme Court L. Rev., 43 (2014); N. Vizioli, Le nomine dei 
giudici della Corte suprema del Canada, in M. Calamo Specchia (ed.), Le Corti costituzionali: 
composizione, indipendenza, legittimazione, Turin, 2011, 155 ff.; J. Ziegel, Séléction au merite et 
democratisation des nominations à la Cour Supreme du Canada, in 5 Choix 2, 6 (1999); D. Songer, 
The Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada, Toronto, 2008, 14 f.; D. White, Political 
Accountability in Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada, in 25 Constitutional Forum Const. 
3, 109 (2016); G. Delledonne, La designazione dei giudici della Corte suprema: osservazioni 
comparatistiche, in G. Delledonne, G. Martinico, L. Pierdominici (eds.), Il costituzionalismo 
canadese a 150 anni dalla Confederazione, cit., 125 ff. The Premier Trudeau - in order to 
substitute the puisne justice Thomas Cromwel and the Chief Justice Beverly MacLachlin, - 
announced the constitution of an independent and non-partisan Advisory Board, which had 
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According to several pressure groups it would be advantageous to pass a bill 
which provides the popular election rather than governmental appointment22. For 
this purpose, a Standing Committee on Justice to Study the Process by which the 
Judges are appointed to courts of appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada was 
established in 2003. In the Committee’s report, the majoritarian Liberal Party 
excluded the hypothesis of parliamentary hearings like in the U.S.A. or public 
interviews like in South Africa or parliamentary elections. It showed a certain 
favour for the obligation of the Minister of Justice to present himself to the Houses 
in order to justify and to defend his appointments and for the creation of a 
committee with the task to select a list made up of three to five candidates among 
whom the Minister would have had to choose one. After the selection, the Minister 
and the committee must be would heard in the House of Commons. The committee 
had to represent as many interests as possible and to include federal and provincial 
government ministers, members of the judicial branch, advocates and people from 
civil society.  
In contrast, the Bloc Quebecois aspired to the provincial appointment. On 
the contrary, the Conservative Party opted for a parliamentary election whilst the 
New Democrats were favourable to parliamentary hearing of the Minister of 
Justice but before the final appointment.  
The aim was to reduce the overwhelming power of government in the 
appointment process in order to avoid the danger of appointments made on the 
basis of political affinity with the government in charge rather than due to 
professional skills, thus impinging on autonomy and impartiality of judges23.  
In order to reduce the relationship between governmental majority and 
judicial branch – as noted above – proposals are oriented to a greater involvement 
of the elective bodies. However, it is clear that a counter-majoritarian role can be 
assured only if the vote regarding the individual designation, either ante or post, is 
assumed through qualified majority so as to involve the opposition parties. 
Otherwise an absolute or relative majority could propose again the political 
orientation of the majority, without increasing the legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court.  
Shifting the appointment process within the parliamentarian context could 
be a reply to the critiques about the lack of legitimization, which sometimes are 
raised against the Supreme Court. Moreover, such a choice could better safeguard 
the principle of sovereignty of Parliament which constitutes a fundamental 
principle of the Canadian legal system. This issue became very relevant after the 
                                                                  
the task of identifying suitable candidates, submitting a short list of five individuals for 
consideration by the Prime Minister. This special system of appointment is based on openness, 
transparency and accountability. On October 28, 2016, Justin Trudeau announced the 
appointment of the Honourable Malcom Rowe and on December 18, 2017, the Prime Minister 
appointed the Honourable Sheilah Martin to the Supreme Court of Canada, while on 
December 12, 2017 he had elevated Justice Wagner as Chief justice.  
22 In 2002, Environics pool reported two-thirds of Canadians favour the popular election of 
the Supreme Court Justices: F. L. Morton, Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter Canada: A 
System in Transition, in K. Malleson, P.H. Russell (eds.), Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial 
Power, Toronto- Buffalo-London, 2006, 56. 
23 The prejudice was fired by the fact that before 1949, more than 50% of judges had served 
as member of legislative assemblies.  
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enactment of sec. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 that poses the Act at the top of 
the system of sources of law, while converting the Supreme Court into a 
constitutional judge. As noted above, legal scholars and politicians were sceptical 
about the prospect of creating an authority deprived of democratic legitimization 
which could strike down act of Parliaments, so to give rise to an era of judicial 
activism rather far from traditional Canadian history24.  
That is a very debated topic among Canadian legal scholars who believe that 
the judicial function can limit the autonomy of elected bodies. At the time of the 
enactment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, especially the Provinces argued 
that the codification of rights in a constitutional document and consequently its 
configuration as a parameter of constitutional review were inconsistent with the 
parliamentary system25. The proceedings of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, 
which have taken place before the final enactment of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, shed light on the risk that the function of Parliament and so of the 
supremacy of its acts, that is to say of statutory law, could be eroded by the judicial 
power.  
The words of Sterling Lyon – Manitoba Prime Minister are a very good and 
striking example in this sense. He underlined that the guarantee of rights could 
be achieved more successfully through the elected assemblies rather than by «men 
albeit learned in the law, who are not necessary aware of everyday concerns of 
Canadians»26. In sum, the introduction of judicial review was perceived as 
undemocratic27, apart from the fact that the adoption of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms was an advancement in the protection of minorities, that wouldn’t have 
reached easily the majority in the elected assemblies28.  
A scholar underlined that «all of these victories for underprivileged 
individuals and groups enhance, rather than undermine, the democratic character 
                                                                  
24 F.L. Morton, R. Knopff, Charter Politics, Scarborough, 1992; F.L. Morton, R. Knopff., The 
Charter Revolution and the Court Party, Peterborough, 2000, 149; C.P. Manfredi, Judicial Power 
and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism, Toronto, 2001; N. Olivetti 
Rason, La giurisprudenza della Corte suprema del Canada, in Giur. cost., 3238 (2003); J.B. Kelly, 
Governing with the Charter: Legislative and Judicial Activism and Framers’, Vancouver, 2005; B.L. 
Strayer, The Canadian Constitution and the Courts, Toronto, 1983, 35 ff. 
25 I. Cotler, Can the Center Hold? Federalism and Rights in Canada, in E. Katz, G.A. Tarr (eds.), 
Federalism and Rights, Lanham, 1996, 174; F.L. Morton, R. Knopff, The Charter Revolution, cit., 
149. 
26 Several Provincial Premiers showed their hostility towards the proposal of change of the 
Supreme Court in a judicial review court: A. Blakeney, the Premier of Saskatchewan and 
member of the New Democratic Party was worried about the possibility that social laws 
enacted could be quashed by the Supreme Court. E. McWhinney, Dilemmas of Judicial Law-
Making, in P. Thibault, B. Pellettier, L. Perret (eds.), Essays in Honour of Gérald A. Beaudoin, 
cit., 326, ft. 47.  
27 F. L. Morton, R. Knopff, The Charter Revolution, cit., 150; F. L. Morton, R. Knopff (ed.), Law, 
Politics and the Judicial Process, cit., 571 f.; S. Gambino, Federalismo, diritti, corti. Riflessioni 
introduttive a partire dall’esperienza canadese, in S. Gambino, C. Amirante (eds.), Il Canada. Un 
laboratorio costituzionale, Padua, 2000, 33 ff.; R. Sharpe, Judicial Activism: The Debate in Canada, 
in C. Casonato (ed.), The Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe: Lessons from Canada, 
Trento, 2004, 11 ff.; C. Casonato, Judges and Rights: Activism, Restraints, and Legitimacy, in C. 
Casonato (ed.), The Protection of Fundamental rights, cit., 27 ff. 
28 P.W. Hogg, The Charter Revolution: Is It Undemocratic?, in 12 Constitutional Forum, 2 (2001-
2002). 
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of our society. The fact that they were won in the courts rather than in the 
legislative arena does not make them less democratic»29.  
Concerns seem to be diminished – albeit not disappeared – for several 
reasons. Firstly, prominent authors have introduced the idea of a dialogue between 
courts and legislature30, by building a collaborative relationship rather than a 
conflicting one.  Secondly the Supreme Court have showed deference to the 
Legislative power, acting with self-restraint and modulating the retroactivity of 
decision invalidating laws concerning very delicate matters31. Lastly the judicial 
body has acquired legitimization from the public opinion32.  
3. The judicial power in Canada: a reflective but even impartial and fair 
judiciary  
Therefore, we can conclude that there is an increasing trend towards the 
incorporation, in the judicial power of members identified on the basis of socio-
cultural and ethnic origins. This is a trend that is confirmed at the comparative 
level33. Nevertheless, it is necessary to give the right weight to the specific groups 
in the Canadian mosaic. Furthermore, it seems important to understand whether 
ad hoc judges carry out their function of legitimacy of the judicial body or if they 
influence the body.  
Starting from the first point, it is undisputable that the Canadian legal 
system relies upon a historic diarchy composed of Anglophone and Francophone 
communities. We have already explained the underlying reason of this union, 
given that, from the one side the Quebeckers claimed the recognition of the status 
of distinct society and, from the other side, the Anglophones made efforts to 
incorporate them into the institutional structure. The position of French origin 
citizens cannot be assimilated to the condition of an ordinary linguistic minority, 
because Canadian history and law recognize to Quebeckers the status of Founding 
People to the same extent as the Anglophone community. Quebec constitutes the 
core of the Canadian Federation. This is an undeniable element from the ancient 
                                                                  
29 R. Sigurdson, Left- and Right-Wing Charterphobia in Canada: A Critique of the Critics, in C. 
Leuprecht, P.H. Russell (eds.), Essential Readings in Canadian Constitutional Politics, Toronto, 
2011, 402.  
30 The reference is to: P.W. Hogg. A.A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue between Court and 
Legislatures (or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All), in 35 Osgoode Hall 
L. J., 75 (1997); P.W. Hogg, A.A. Bushell, W.K. Wright, Charter Dialogue Revisited – or “Much 
Ado About Metaphors”, in 45 Osgoode Hall L. J., 1 (2007). 
31 A case in point can be the decision Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 
331, 2015 SCC 5 about the prohibition against physician-assisted dying, where the Court 
suspended its ruling for 12 months. See S. Rodriquez, Tecniche di bilanciamento tra diritto alla 
vita e libertà personale: l’attivismo della Corte canadese e il dialogo con i giudici di Strasburgo, in E. 
Ceccherini (ed.), I diritti al tempo delle crisi. Nuove tecniche di ponderazione, Naples, 2018, 205 ff. 
32 The data of Angus Reid Institute show that 74% of Canadians declares their satisfaction for 
the decisions of the Supreme Court and that 61% of Canadians trust in the Supreme Court in 
parallel only 28% of the citizens trusts in the Parliament, see www.angusreid.org (15 August 
2015).  
33 K. Nobbs, International Benchmarks a Review of Minority Participation in the Judiciary, in M. 
Weller (ed.), Political Participation of Minorities, Oxford, 2010, 589 ff. 
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time of its foundation.  The debate for the approval of the British North America 
Act showed this point clearly.   
We could mention the words of Hector Langevin who stated in Parliament 
that French Canadians were “separate people” and was afraid of the withdraw of 
French customs, uses and law. He was not the only deputy who even if favourable 
to the federation project expressed his concern about the possible assimilation of 
French Canadians to the predominant Anglophone culture.  
The strong integrational compact explains the reasons for the creation of a 
unique and united Federation, which characterizes the institutional architecture 
of Canada, and has been reiterated throughout times by the Supreme Court. Very 
often the latter behaves as a guarantor of the francophone peculiarity in the 
Federation both in Quebec and outside of its borders.  
In an important leading case which dates back to the ‘30s, the Court ruled: 
«Inasmuch as the Act embodies a compromise under which the original Provinces 
agreed to federate, it is important to keep in mind that the preservation of the 
rights of minorities was a condition on which such minorities entered into the 
federation, and the foundation upon which the whole structure was subsequently 
erected. The process of interpretation as the years go on ought not to be allowed 
to dim or to whittle down the provisions of the original contract upon which the 
federation was founded, nor is it legitimate that any judicial construction of the 
provisions of ss. 91 and 92 should impose a new and different contract upon the 
federating bodies»34. 
The guarantee of francophone culture in Canada has been recently restated 
in the reference for the Senate35 where about the question concerning the removal 
of the real property requirement according to which Senators should own land 
worth at least $ 4000 in the Province for which they are appointed. This 
requirement would violate sec. 23(3) Constitution Act, 1987 which allows Quebec 
                                                                  
34 re The Regulation and Control of Aeronautics (1932) A. C. 54 at 70. On this point, M. D. Behiels, 
Canada’s Francophone Minority Communities. Constitutional Renewal and the Winning of School 
Governance, Montréal, 2004, X. 
35 Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704. On this reference see: P.E. 
Mendes, Constitutional Options after the Supreme Court’s Decision in Reference Re Senate Reform: 
Restoring Trust and Credibility through Senate Reform, in 35 NJCL 1, 85 (2015); J. I. Colón-Ríos, 
A. C. Hutchinson, Constitutionalizing the Senate: A Modest Democratic Proposal, in 60 McGill L. 
J. 4, 599 (2014); A. Dodeck, The Politics of the Senate Reform Reference: Fidelity, Frustration, and 
Federal Unilateralism, in 60 McGill L. J. 4, 623 (2014) ff.; R. Albert, Constitutional Amendment 
by Stealth, ibidem, in 60 McGill L. J. 4, 673 (2014) ff.; Y. Danwood, The Senate Reference. 
Constitutional Change and Democracy, in 60 McGill L. J. 4, 737 (2014); C. Mathieu, P. Taillon, 
Le fédéralisme comme principe matriciel dans l’interpretation de la procedure de modification 
constitutionnelle, in 60 McGill L. J. 4, 763 (2014); N. Karazivan, De la structure constitutionnelle 
dans le Renvoi relative au Sénat: vers une gestalt constitutionnelle?, in 60 McGill L. J. 4, 793, (2014); 
K. Glover, The Supreme Court in a Pluralistic World: Four Readings of a Reference, in 60 McGill 
L. J. 4, 839 (2014); E. Macfarlane, Unsteady Architecture: Ambiguity, the Senate Reference, and the 
Future of Constitutional Amendment in Canada, in 60 McGill L. J. 4, 883 (2014); C. Cornell, 
Reference re Senate Reform and the Supreme Court of Canada’s Clarification of the Constitutional 
Procedure for Reforming the Canadian Parliament’s Upper House, in 20 Law & Bus. Rev. Am., 451 
(2014); E. Arban, Current trends in Canadian federalism. Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in 
Canadian Division of Powers, in 
www.amministrazioneincammino.luiff.it/app/uploads/2010/08/Current-trends-in-
Canadian-federalism1.pdf 
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senators not to reside in the electoral divisions for which they have been appointed. 
This provision constitutes an exception to the general rule applied to Quebec 
senators exclusively, who must have property in Quebec, albeit without being 
compelled to have their residence in the Province. On this issue, the Court pointed 
out the special arrangement reserved to Quebeckers and ruled that the full repeal 
of the property requirement embodied in sec. 23(3) requires the consent of 
legislative assembly of Quebec, under the special arrangements procedure. This 
amending formula recognizes Quebec’s veto power of and the privileged position 
of the Province in the constitutional framework.  
The relevance of the Quebec position in the constitutional compact which 
gave the birth to the Federation was addressed in another reference of 2014 
concerning the eligibility requirements for Quebec appointments36. The reference 
is subdivided into two questions: the first one  affects the fact whether a person 
who was at any time an advocate of at least ten years standing  at the Barreau du 
Quebec was qualified for appointment under sec. 6 of the Supreme Court Act, 1985 
given that the selection should be made «from among the advocates of that 
Province»; the second one refers to the possibility for the Parliament to enact 
ordinary statutes in order to interpret the requirement of sec. 6 of the Supreme 
Court Act, 1875.  
The Court’s majority opinion excluded that the general requirements 
encompassed in sec. 5 – which reserved the appointment to current judges of a 
superior court of a province, including the court of appeal, to former judges of such 
a court, to current barristers or advocates standing at the bar of the Province for 
at least 10 years –  and to former barristers or advocates standing at least 10 years 
can be extended to the judges coming from Quebec.  
The reason is included in sec. 6 of the same Act, which in its English version 
provided that at least three of the judges must be appointed among the judges of 
the Court of Appeal or of the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec or among 
the advocates of that Province. Sec. 6 narrows the array from four kinds of people 
who are eligible under sec. 5 to two groups who are eligible under sec. 6. The 
explanation of this differentiation is based on the need to assure to the Court the 
presence of civil law experts and to represent legal tradition and social values from 
Quebec to maintain Quebec’s confidence in the supreme judicial body.  
A distinct regulation is the result of the historic bargain which gave birth to 
the Act regulating the institution of the Supreme Court37. It enshrines a symbolic 
significance and not only a technical one; it assures the permanent linkage between 
the judges and the French-Canadian society.  
                                                                  
36 Reference re Supreme Court Act, ff. 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 433. The 
reference was motivated by the appointment of Justice Nadon, a supernumerary judge of the 
Federal Court of Appeal and formerly, but not at the time of this appointment, a member of 
the Quebec bar of more ten years standings. His appointment was challenged before the 
Federal Court of Canada.  
37 P.H. Russell, The Supreme Court of Canada as a Bilingual and Bicultural Institution, Ottawa, 
1969. 
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In the reference, the legislative history of the Act demonstrates that the 
provision of ad hoc seats for judges coming from Quebec was aimed at 
implementing the trust in the new judicial body by Quebeckers.  
The analysis of the Act helps understand that Quebec representation is not 
only linked to the necessity to have civil law skills but also constitutes a 
fundamental milestone of the constituent compromise that has led to the adoption 
of the British North America Act, which reshaped the Canadian dominion, so to 
turning it into a federal state.  
The conclusions of the majority opinion were reached by adopting a literal 
and purposive analysis. The literal meaning was taken into account because the 
text of sec. 6 expressly requires the current membership of the Barreau du Quebec 
or of the Court of Appeal or of the Superior Court of Quebec while derogating 
from sec. 5 of the Act. The purpose of the provision was considered as well, because 
this piece of legislation represents the historic compromise that brought to 
Federation. It provides a French-Canadian quota of justices so as the court could 
have civil law training and could be trusted from by Quebec citizens, while 
recognizing the special status of their Province. The enactment of an ad hoc 
provision for Quebeckers permitted to overcome all the criticism coming from 
provincial representatives and to increase the confidence in the new body.  
In respect of the second question affecting the possibility for an ordinary 
statute to extend the general requirements embodied in sec. 5 and in sec. 6 of the 
Act, the court deemed that issues related to the Supreme Court, after the 
Patriation, have been attracted in the domain of constitutional sources of law 
specifically in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. Therefore any law amending 
the Supreme Court Act, 1875 must have constitutional rank although the Act 
regulating the composition and function of the Supreme Court was an ordinary 
statute. At the moment the judicial authority is a constitutional body and it said 
that its regulation was upgraded to constitutional level.  
Even in this case, the genesis and context of the Act explains the 
characteristic of the accommodation between the two founding peoples who want 
to maintain the bijuralism of the Federation. This goal was present also in previous 
agreements reached before the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982.  For 
instance, in the April Accord, 1981, in which there is a confirmation of the 
intention to limit Parliament’s unilateral authority to reform the Supreme Court 
so as to make it more difficult to modify the court’s composition. Indeed, the 
amending formula for this part requires the unanimity and so the Quebec’s 
representation was given special constitutional protection.  
The reference of the court de facto renders unalterable the constituent 
covenant that has institutionalized the diarchy between Anglophones and 
Francophones. Such agreement implies the duty to allocate ad hoc seats for Quebec 
in order to strengthen the link between societas of the Province and the federal 
institution.  
In fact, the primary goal does not seem to be the need to defend the interests 
of Quebec through the Francophone representation but rather to legitimate the 
judgments of the court from Quebec, due to its specific representation. In other 
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words, the outcomes of decisions less characterized by a pro-provincial approach 
(rectius pro-Quebec) would be legitimated because the judicial body incorporates a 
francophone representation and for this reason these decisions can be more easily 
endorsed38.  
Moreover, indicating the current professional activity –  as a requirement 
for the appointment to the Supreme Court – guarantees the presence of skills in 
civil law, which is a fundamental feature of the Quebec identity. In this regard, the 
Honourable Justice Piere-Basile Mignaut said: «for the people of  Quebec, our civil 
law is our most precious asset after our religion and language. It is a legacy we 
have received from our fathers, to be maintained and passed on to future 
generations. It is our duty and responsibility to honour and preserve our civil law, 
to ensure the purity of  its doctrine and keep it safe from any influence that would 
prevent it from being what it should be»39. 
This framework downscales the strength of the view according to which the 
francophone representation carries out its function of adjudication in a partial way 
and uncritically pro-Quebec. This conclusion could affect all of the other 
components of the court who, in any case, represent other provinces. In other 
terms, a francophone “faction” is not present in the Supreme Court and few 
dissenting opinions were delivered by the three French Canadian Justices in 
juxtaposition with the Anglophone majority.  
Three exceptions to this general statement can be mentioned concerning 
cases that involve relevant matters: Public Service Board v. Dionne40 and Capital 
Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio Television Commission41 relating 
culture and communication and Quebec A.G. v. Canada42.  The first two decisions 
were delivered by the Supreme Court in 1978 and reaffirmed the full federal 
competence in the matter of television broadcasting either cable or wireless, 
leaving apart the legislative intervention of Provincial Legislatures, while the 
third one was recently issued after the enactment of Constitution Act, 1982.  
The first two cases are meaningful since the opinions of all of the three 
French Canadians justices were strongly contrary to the majority opinion, stating 
that the cable tv matter was reserved to the Provinces. The dissenting judges did 
not agree with the idea according to which since wireless broadcasting is a 
                                                                  
38 R. Schertzer, Quebec Justices as Quebec Representatives: National Minority Representation and the 
Supreme Court, in 46 Publius 4, 539 (2016); P. Patenaude, Le Québec et la Cour suprême, in 14 
Alta L. Rev., 138 (1976). 
39 P.-B. Mignault, L’avenir de notre droit civil, in 56 Revue de droit, 116 (1922), the quotation 
comes from S. Morin, Quebec: First Impressions Can Be Misleading, in S. Farranm, E. Örücü, S.P. 
Donlan (eds.), A Study of Mixed Legal Systems: Endangered, Entrenched or Blended, Dorchester, 
2014, 169 always concerning the same topic: S. Normand, Un thème dominant de la pensée 
juridique traditionnelle au Québec: la sauvegarde de l’integrité du droit civil, in 32 McGill L. J., 559 
(1987); S. Normand , Le code civil et l’identité, in S. Lorie, N. Kasirer, J.-G. Belley (eds.), Du Code 
civil du Québec: contribution à l’histoire immédiate d’une recodification réussie, Montréal, 2005, 619 
ff.; W. Tettley, Mixed Jurisdictions. Common Law vs. Civil Law (codified and Uncodified), in 60 
Louisiana Law Review, 677 (2000).  
40 Public Service Board et al. v. Dionne et al., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 191. 
41 Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio Television Commission [1978] 2 
S.C.R. 141. 
42 Quebec A.G. v. Canada, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 693, 2015 SCC 14. 
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competence of the Federation, then, due to some attractive vis even the cable 
communication should be regulated by federal level. In the dissenting opinions, 
this interpretation was deemed to be in contrast with the sec. 92 of BNA43, which 
would cover this kind of communication because it involves the landline telephone 
communication. The access of the Province to this competence beyond the 
economic interest –  would have a strategic importance to build and maintain the 
distinctive values of francophone culture in a perspective of cultural 
protectionism44. In consideration of the relevance of the issue, harsh comments 
were addressed against the opinion of the court, which was blamed of ignoring 
claims and requests made by Provinces.  
This event compelled Chief Justice Bora Laskin to say that: «Judges are 
completely independent of any influences in their decisions (…) the source of our 
appointment in no way qualifies our independence. We have no duty to 
governments, no duty to litigants, except to apply the law according to our ability. 
I do not represent the federal government nor do I represent Ontario which is my 
home province I represent no one but myself. (…) I know of no better way to 
subvert our judicial system, no better way to destroy it than to give currency to 
the view that the Judiciary must be a representative agency»45. 
Nevertheless, friction factors relying upon provincial claims have decreased 
within the Supreme Court especially after the enactment of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms in 1982. Many commentators agree that the shift of function of the 
Supreme Court has changed its approach to legal reasoning too, in the sense that 
it aims at enhancing a cooperative federalism, rather than a conflicting one46. In 
addition, data show that a centripetal movement of Canadian federalism is taking 
                                                                  
43 Sec. 92 (10) Local Works and Undertakings other than such as are of the following Classes: 
(a) Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways, Roads, Telegraphs, and other Works and 
Undertakings connecting the Province with any other or others of the Provinces, or extending 
beyond the Limits of the Province. 
44 On the topic of building a national identity through medias, see P.K. Kresl, Come formare 
una cultura nazionale in un mondo senza confini, in G. Rolla (ed.), Lo sviluppo dei diritti 
fondamentali in Canada, Milan, 2000, 277 ff.; K. Ross, P. Playdon (eds.), Black Marks: Ethnic 
Minority and Media, London, 2001, 33 ff.; B. Larsen, T. Tufte, Is There a Ritual Going On? 
Exploring the Social Uses of the Media, in I. Bandebjerg, H.K. Hastrup (eds.), Sekvens, Yearbook 
1999: Intertextuality and Visual Media, Copenhagen, 1999, 181 f. 
45 The Ottawa Journal 23 1978 in 
https://www.newspapers.com/title_1188/the_ottawa_journal/ But see before: B. Laskin, 
The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadians, in 29 Can. Bar Rev., 1038 
(1951).  
46 E. Brouillet, The Supreme Court of Canada: The Concept of Cooperative Federalism and its Effects 
on the Balance of Power, in N. Ayrones, J. Kincaid (eds.), Courts in Federal Countries: Federalists 
or Unitarists, Toronto, 2017; C. Mathieu, P. Taillon, Le fédéralisme comme principe matriciel, cit., 
763 ff.; J. Leclair, The Supreme Court of Canada’s Understanding of Federalism: Efficiency at the 
Expense of Diversity, in J.-F- Gaudreault-Des Biens, F. Gélinas (eds.), Le fédéralisme dans tous 
les États. Gouvernance, identité et methodologie, Bruxelles-Cowansville, 2005, 383 f.; G.-A. 
Beaudoin, La Cour suprême et le fédéralisme canadien, in E. Orban (ed.), Fédéralisme et cours 
suprêmes, Bruxelles-Montréal, 1991, 81 ff.. The web site of the Supreme Court regarding 2006-
2016 data proves this statement.  
46 J.B. Kelly, Judging the Judges; The Decline of Dissent in the Supreme Court’s Charter Decisions, 
in F.L. Morton (ed.), Law, Politics, cit., 560 ff.; D. Songer, The Transformation of the Supreme 
Court, cit., 203 f.; C. L’Heureux-Dubé, The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future, in 38 Osgoode 
Hall L. J. 3, 495 (2000).  
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place47 and that there is a reinforcement of collegial decision held at the 
unanimity48. This statement is supported by an element: in cases in which matters 
that are very relevant to Quebec are debated, French Canadians justices did not 
adopt francophone sectarianism or embrace positions very close to separatist 
attitudes. On the contrary, opinions were delivered at unanimity and they 
witnessed that the judicial body generally showed unitary opinions lacking of 
nationalistic or partisan shades. Given this, bijuralism and territorial cleavages of 
the court do not hinder the creation of the κοινή which has been sometimes 
challenged by political institutions and civil society.  
In recent years, it has not been possible to single out a francophone block 
which counterposes against the rest of Canada representatives with the exception 
of the case abovementioned: Quebec A. G. v. Canada. In fact, some reflections arise 
from a recent case   where three justices from Quebec delivered a dissenting 
opinion, jointly with Justice Abella. The Province of Quebec challenged the 
constitutionality of sec. 29 of the Ending Long Gun Register, which imposed the 
destruction of all records hosted in a data base, which contained all the certificates 
for every arm acquired, transferred or possessed in Canada. Such database had 
been created by all Provinces effort. The Federal Act had been enacted by relying 
on the Federation’s competence on criminal jurisdiction but Quebec objected it 
had the right to obtain the data regarding the territory of Quebec. The Attorney 
General of Quebec pointed out that the evolution of Canadian federalism is 
favorable to a flexible approach on the division of competences and the case should 
be solved through the principle of cooperative federalism. In addition, the federal 
act can affect a specific provincial matter, which is property and civil rights.  
Therefore a joint decision about this matter would be preferable49. 
It is not easy to determine if this case will be able to open a new phase in the 
relationship between Quebec and the rest of Canada, but, anyway, this judgment 
alone cannot frustrate the  initial hypothesis about the impartiality and autonomy 
of the bench in a context of reflective judiciary at least in Canada. This statement 
                                                                  
47 F.L. Morton, The Political Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in 20 Can. 
J. Pol. Sc., 44 (1987); M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada, 
Toronto, 1989, 36; E. Richez, Losing Relevance: Quebec and the Constitutional Politics of Language, 
in 52 Osgoode Hall L. J., 1, 2014, 191; E. Brouillet, The Supreme Court of Canada:, cit., 142; J. 
Woehrling, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Its Consequences for Political and 
Democratic Life and the Federal System, in A.-G. Gagnon (ed.), Contemporary Federalism, cit., 235; 
A. Lajoie, Garantir l’intégration des valeurs minoritaires dans le droit: une entreprise irréalisable par 
la voie structurelle, in J.-F- Gaudreault-Des Biens, F. Gélinas (eds.), Le fédéralisme dans tous les 
États., cit., 377 f.. 
48 E. Mac Farlane, Consensus and Unanimity at the Supreme Court of Canada, in 52 Supreme Court 
L. Rev., 379 (2010); D. Songer, J. Siripurapu, The Unanimous Cases of the Supreme Court of 
Canada as Test of Attitudinal Model, in 42 Can. J. Pol. Sc. 1, 2009, 87; P. McCormick, Bias, 
Swarms, and Outliers: Conceptualizing Disagreement on the Modern Supreme Court of Canada, in 
42 Osgoode Hall L. J., 107 (2004); P. McCormick, The Choral Court: Separate Concurrence and 
the McLachlin Court 2000-2004, in 37 Ottawa L. Rev. 1, 37 (2005); P. McCormick, “By the Court”: 
The Untold Story of a Canadian Judicial Innovation, in 53 Osgoode Hall L. Journ. 3, 1048 (2016); 
C. L’Heureux-Dubé, The Length and Plurality of Supreme Court of Canada Decisions, in 28 Alta 
L. Rev. 3, 586 (1990).  
49 P. Daly, Dismantling Regulatory Structures: Canada’s Long-Gun Registry as Case Study, in 33 
NJCL 2, 169 (2014).  
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is based on the analysis of the dissenting opinions. When they were delivered by 
three Québécois justices, they would reveal a strong disagreement with the rest of 
the Anglophone-oriented judicial body, giving credit to the hypothesis of the 
existence of a “Francophone Justice party”; by contrast, the inexistence of a shared 
vision among the three French-Canadian Justices can be detected. It does not 
emerge, in fact, any “functional” and cultural bond of the Francophone Justices to 
the referring Province, rather a professional contribution to the ius dicere duty of 
the court. Therefore, their territorial provenience has the prevailing purpose to 
legitimize the jurisdictional activity of the whole court. In this context, pluralism 
of the Supreme Court reflects the heterogeneity of the Canadian society, but does 
not foster conflicts. The court is a neutral body that promotes a cooperative 
federalism. In fact, inspired by several cases related to meaningful topics such as 
the cultural and linguistic ones, the court did not hesitate to deliver solutions that 
were “not Quebec-oriented”. An interesting case that may be mentioned is Ford v. 
Quebec50, which is relevant not only for issues related to language but also for the 
applicability of the notwithstanding clause of sec. 33 of Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, that is the means by which Premier Pierre Elliot Trudeau achieved the 
consent to the Patriation process51.  
Firstly, the decision in the Ford case was delivered at unanimity and so no 
ethnic-linguistic rift was arisen, although the matter was crucial for Quebec 
people. Secondly, the judgment is very  important with respect to the applicability 
of sec. 33. The application of the clause to the Bill 101, which avoids the judicial 
review of legislation, is consistent with the purpose of the Charter. However, the 
court struck down sec. 58 and 69 of the Charter of French Language, which 
banned commercial signs written in language other than French, because these 
provisions were not consistent with the limitation clause of sec. 1 of the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms. The evidences produced in the court about material facts 
                                                                  
50 Ford v. Quebec [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712. On this topic, see also the case The King v. Dubois 
[1935] S.C.R. 378.  
51 Section 33: (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act 
of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall 
operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15. (2) An Act or a 
provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made under this section is in effect shall 
have such operation as it would have but for the provision of this Charter referred to in the 
declaration. (3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five years 
after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the declaration. (4) 
Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration made under subsection 
(1). (5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection (4). D. 
Newman, Refractive and Prismatic Analysis in Implicit Comparative Constitutional Law in this 
issue; P. Kaye, The Notwithstanding Clause (Sec. 33 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms), 
Toronto, 1992, 31 f.; P.H. Russell, Standing Up for Notwithstanding, in 29 Alta L. Rev. 2, 293 
(1991); T. Kahana, What Makes for a Good Use of the Notwithstanding Mechanism, in 23 Supreme 
Court L. Rev., 191 (2004); L. Weinrib, Learning to live with the override, in 35 McGill L. J., 542 
(1990); K. Roach, Dialogue or Defiance: Legislative Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions in Canada 
and the United States, in 4 Int’l J. Const. L. 2, 347 (2006); J. Cameron, The Charter’s Legislative 
Override: Feat or Figment of the Constitutional Imagination?, in 23 Supreme Court L. Rev., 135 
(2004); J. L. Hiebert, Is it Too Late to Rehabilitate Canada’s Notwithstanding Clause?, in 23 
Supreme Court L. Rev., 169 (2004); S. Gardbaum The New Commonwealth Model of 
Constitutionalism, Cambridge, 2013, 97; R. Albert, The Desuetude of the Notwithstanding Clause - 
and How to Revive It, in Boston College Law School Research paper 425, 2016. 
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did not justify the limitation to freedom of expression imposed by ss. 58 and 69 of 
the Charter of the French Language. Despite the fact that the Quebec Government 
had the purpose to enhance the status of French language, the legislative 
intervention was neither necessary nor proportional. Yet the motivation of Quebec 
Government of Bill 101 made reference to the need of protecting the “visage 
linguistique”. Therefore, the override clause represented the tool aimed at 
recognizing Quebec speciality. 
The idea that francophone justices in the court do not “represent” Quebec 
claims has emerged also in other significant cases. The 1998 Secession Reference 
was a case of high political relevance and the outcomes could be very detrimental 
for the federal pattern. The court unanimously that the secession of a portion of 
territory is legal, in theory, but must not be carried out unilaterally; a secession 
can happen only at the end of a negotiated path with the Federation and the other 
Provinces and after a popular consultation with a strong majority in favour of the 
project. Unilateral secession can be justified only in case of infringement of 
citizens’ rights and if democratic rules are violated. The court took a firm stance 
on this point, behaving again as a federal institution oriented towards the unity of 
the state. Judges stated that the federation is the most suitable institution to 
safeguard the cultural and ethnic minorities which form the majority within a 
specific province. In this way, the Supreme Court enhanced the protection of 
cultural diversity in a federal form of state52.   
In the examined cases, the Supreme Court acts as the protector of Federation 
and of the competence of the Provinces, including Quebec, whose historic and 
cultural diversity is considered but not overexposed. The francophone justices 
deliver opinions in which the Quebecois peculiarity is highlighted and stressed but 
it is not used instrumentally against the Federation. In other words, Quebec is not 
recognised a special position. The Province does not have a veto power as argued 
in the Quebec veto Reference, where the all members of the court stated that 
Quebec can not enjoy a special treatment because the Federation is based on the 
equality of all its components. The Supreme Court reveals a neutral, or  pan-
canadian approach and data show the same attitude: looking at the judgments from 
1982 to 2002 concerning the conflict between Federation and Provinces, 58.6% of 
its decisions have been in favour of Government of Ottawa and among these 75% 
involved Quebec. 
                                                                  
52 D. Haljan, Constitutionalising Secession, Portland (Or), 2014, 325; S. Alvstad, The Québec 
Secession Issue, with an Emphasis on the “Cultural” Side of Equation, in 18 Temple ICLJ, 89 (2004); 
M. Dawson, Reflections on the Opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Québec Secession 
Reference, in 11 NJCL, 5 (1999); P. Monahan, The Public Policy Role of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Secession Reference, 11 NJCL, 65 (1999); C. L. Ford, In Search of the Qualitative Clear 
Majority: Democratic Experimentalism and the Québec Secession Reference, in 39 Alta L. Rev. 2,, 511 
(2001); J. Leclair, The Secession Reference. A Ruling in Search of a Nation, in 34 RJT, 885 (2000); 
A. Bayefsky (ed.), Self-determination in International Law: Québec and Lessons Learned, Deventer, 
2000; P. Dumberry, The Secession Question in Quebec, in DPCE, 2015, 357 ff.; K. Basta, The State 
between Minority and Majority Nationalism: Decentralization, Symbolic Recognition and Secessionist 
Crises in Spain and in Canada, in 48 Publius 1, 51 (2017); J.-F. Gaudreault-Des Biens, Secession 
Blues: Some Legal and Political Challenges Facing the Independence Movement in Quebec, in Percorsi 
costituzionali, 2014, 765. 
 The Judicial Power in Canada 
 
 
DPCE online, 2019/1 – Saggi  
ISSN: 2037-6677 
723 
Summing up the representation of Quebec in the court does not perform in 
favour of the Province. Its attitude seems to be aimed at building a connection 
between Federation and Quebec. They do not feel constrained by a constituent 
community and do not represent a particular part in the judicial decision-making 
process. They seem to have inclusive, and not adversarial, purposes. 
This approach is not exempt from critics, especially by legal scholars who 
would be more favourable to a judicial activism pro-Quebec, promoting a more 
decentralized system of government53. Not only, several critique have risen 
regarding interpretation issue of French legal texts, whose exegesis convey the 
common law influence54.  
4.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we discussed the attempt of the Canadian constitutional system to 
incorporate the cultural and linguistic diversities in the judiciary. One more 
relevant point seems to be that there is an increasing interest in promoting the 
diversity in the judicial recruitment. This aspiration to manifest the diversity in 
judicial bodies is spreading. We can notice that sec. 2.13 of the Universal 
Declaration on the independence of Justice of Montréal in 1983 provides that: «the 
process and standards of judicial selection shall give due consideration to ensuring 
a fair reflection of the judiciary of the society in all its aspects»55. In the same wake, 
the International Bar Association Code on Minimum Standards of Judicial 
Independence states that «The process and standards of judicial selection must 
insure fair representation of all social classes, ethnic and religious groups, 
ideological inclinations and where appropriate, geographical regions. The 
representation should be fit and not numerically or accurately proportional56».  
In the framework of the OCSE either the Declaration of Copenaghen (1990) 
or of Lund (1992) put the attention to the issue of participation of minorities in the 
administration of justice. Sec. 30 of the first one rules that: «The participating 
States recognize that the questions relating to national minorities can only be 
satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework based on the rule of law, 
with a functioning independent judiciary». At the same time the latter points out, 
in the chapter related to the participation in decision-making (point six), that: 
                                                                  
53 S. Ishiyama Smithey, The Effect of the Canadian Supreme Court’s Charter Interpretation on 
Regional and Intergovernmental Tensions in Canada, in 26 Publius 2, 83 (1996); J.B. Kelly, M. 
Murphy, Shaping the Constitutional Dialogue on Federalism: Canada’s Supreme Court as Meta-
Political Actor, in 35 Publius 2, 217 (2005).  
54 On this issue see, F. Coté, Human Rights and the Judicial Subjugation of a Nation’s Legal 
Language: A Case Study on the Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the 
Dynamics of Québec Private Law, in Y. Ning, J.-G. Turi, C. Le (eds.), Law, Language and Justice, 
Marietta (Ge), 2017, 141 ff. 
55 S. Shetreet, The Doctrinal Reasoning for More Women Judges: The Principle of Reflective 
Judiciary, in S. Shetreet (ed.), Women in Law, London-Cambridge, 1998, 190; S. Shetreet, The 
Emerging Transnational Jurisprudence on Judicial Independence: The IBA Standards and Montreal 
Declaration, in S. Shetreet, J. Deschênes (eds.), Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate, 
Dordrecht, 1985, 393 ff. The statement was strongly supported by African delegation where 
the topic of ethnic and tribal belonging is very relevant.  
56 S. Shetreet, The Doctrinal Reasoning, cit., 189.  
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«States should ensure that opportunities exist for minorities to have an effective 
voice at the level of the central government, including through special 
arrangements as necessary. These may include, depending upon the 
circumstances: special representation of national minorities, for example, (…) 
formal or informal understandings for allocating to members of national 
minorities (…) seats on the supreme or constitutional court or lower courts».   
From this perspective, Canada has been a forerunner legal system. In fact, 
from the entry into force of the Supreme Court Act, 1875 onwards a legal quota 
for francophone judges has been reserved, leaving to the customary law the 
indication of the other seats which are reserved to the Provinces.   
However, a greater attention towards the diversity in the judicial branch has 
moved to the lower courts, becoming a meaningful issue at political level. In 2016, 
the Minister of Justice declared that: «We know that our country is stronger, and 
our judicial system more effective, when our judges reflect Canada's diversity. As 
promised, we have filled the urgent judicial vacancies by drawing on a list of 
recommended candidates who are of the highest calibre and who are as diverse as 
Canada»57.  
The attention to this debate has increased in the last years and from a 
chronological point of view has involved the gender matter. It is worth to 
remember that only a strong pressure held by the National Action Committee on 
the Status of Women brought to the result of the appointment of Bertha Wilson, 
in 1982, as the first woman in the Supreme Court, after having been appointed as 
the first woman of the Court of Appeal of Ontario in 1975.  In relation to 
the gender issue, an increase of female appointments in the federal courts can be 
seen as well: in the ‘80s, only 3% of judges were women, in 1990 the percentage  
increased to 10% and became 25% in 2002, currently 36% women belong to the 
federal bench58. The Premier Brian Mulroney, in his first mandate between 1984 
and 1988, appointed 17% of women. Among all, the appointments in the Supreme 
Court of Claire L’Heureux Dubé in 1987 and Beverly McLachlin in 1988 (who 
were appointed Chief Justice by Jean Chretien in 2000) must be included. At the 
Provincial level, the Ontario Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee, which 
was established in 1989, has promoted the appointments of women in its first six 
years of function, thus  increasing the amount from 3% to 22% and selecting three 
justices belonging to First Nations, ten to visible minorities and even eight to 
French Canadians; Ontario was the first Province to appoint the first aboriginal, 
the first Eastern Asian and the first black woman judge59. 
At the Supreme Court level, it seems that a customary norm exists, 
providing that there have to be three women among its members, while on the 
contrary the representation of the other social components is weaker. However, 
several signals show a shift. Jean Chretien has appointed the first justice in the 
Supreme Court of Ukrainian origins, John Sopinka and the first of Italian 
                                                                  
57 The Honourable Jody Wilson-Raybould Minister of Justice and Attorney General of 
Canada news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1086309 22th of July 2016.  
58 B. McLachlin, Canada’s Legal System at 150: Democracy and the Judicary, in https://www.scc-
csc.ca/judges-juges/spe-dis/bm-2016-06-03-eng.aspx 21st of June 2016. 
59 L. Morton, Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter Canada, cit., 70. 
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descendent, Frank Iacobucci too60. Indeed, Justice Larry La Forme was appointed 
as the first aboriginal people to the Court of Appeal of Ontario in 2004. Justice 
Maurice Charles has been the first black judge called to the Provincial Court of 
Ontario in 1969 and Justice Michael Tulloch was appointed to the Court of Appeal 
of Ontario in 2012.  
It’s obvious that the purpose of creating the judiciary as a mirror of the socio-
cultural diversity is one of the most relevant aim of the Government, since 
pluralism existing in the society has considered as a quid pluris to be enhanced, 
even in a field in which the function is exercised in the general interest of the 
community and not in accordance with a specific group interest. The extension of 
the mirror representation to all level of judiciary is encompassed also in the 
guidelines of the Provincial Judicial Advisory Committees for the proposals of the 
judicial appointments61.   
Diversity can increase judicial legitimization and reduce criticism about the 
lack of non-democratic origin of the judges. Cases involving delicate issue can be 
met with more public approval, and divisiveness can reach more easily an 
accommodation. 
The survey showed that there is a perception of the existence of a quid pluris 
in the multifaceted composition of the judiciary. Firstly, there is a strengthen of 
the social cohesion and indirectly of democracy, which is distinguished rather by 
a project of inclusion than for one of alienation. By the way, how could the different 
groups trust in a judicial system which is not able to include the diversity of the 
population?62 The admission to judicial career of members of communities who 
have been excluded in the past may only make the function of judging more 
plausible, which might enshrine distinct perspectives, and not solely those of 
prevalent class 
After all, if it is true that we are living in “judgeocracy” era, a realistic 
counterweight can be the full and active participation of minorities in the judicial 
function.   
However, we cannot deny that the issue of reflective judiciary is 
controversial because it may collide with a milestone of democratic system which 
connects itself to the constitutional traditions of judicial impartiality and 
independence. These outlines seem to be barriers to the implementation of 
diversities in the judiciary, but they can not be an excuse for a failure to implement 
                                                                  
60 L. Morton, Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter Canada, cit., 59 f. 
61 «Along with this assessment of professional competence and overall merit, Committees 
must strive to create a pool of candidates that is gender-balanced and reflective of the diversity 
of each jurisdiction, including Indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities, and members of 
linguistic, ethnic and other minority communities, including those whose members’ gender 
identity or sexual orientation differs from that of the majority. In doing so, Committees should 
give due consideration to all legal experience, including that outside of mainstream legal 
practice. Broad consultations by the Committees, and community involvement through these 
consultations are essential elements of the process». www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-
nominations/committees-comites/guidelines-lignes-eng.html 
62 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, 1971.  
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measures to enhance diversity, or at least, to prevent practises that reduce 
representativeness63.  
For instance, the entrenchment of Justices coming from the Provinces in the 
Supreme Court has not hindered the capacity of the judicial body to deliver 
impartial and reasonable decisions. As a consequence, the trust and the credibility 
in the Supreme Court have increased, producing an undeniable benefit for the 
whole legal system.    
After exploring the jurisprudence of the court, we can affirm that the 
Francophone Justices perform their task with commitment and loyalty to the ius 
dicere rather than to their cultural and linguistic belonging. Nevertheless, their 
presence in the body has doubtless contributed to the nation-building process 
which sometimes is put to the test by political challenges 
 For this reason, both the 1987 Meech Lake Accord and the 1992 
Charlottetown Accord advocated a reform in respect to appointments to the 
Supreme Court in the direction of reinforcing the Provincial and aboriginal 
representation within the body.  
Specifically, Meech Lake Accord proposed amendments which entrenched 
Quebec’s right to three judges on the Court and let every Province select a list of 
candidates to be appointed to the Court. Likewise, Charlottetown Accord 
established the so called “Canada clause” which entailed the recognition of Quebec 
as distinct society within Canada. 
 
 
                                                                  
63 F. Gélinas, Judicial Independence in Canada. A Critical Overview, in A. Seibrt-Fohr (ed.), 
Judicial Independence in Transition, Heidelberg, 2012, 575. 
